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This article draws on debates about the ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory to consider the normative challenges raised by descent-based Aboriginal membership rules in Canada. The boundary paradox is one of the most intractable puzzles of democratic theory. If a demos is necessarily bounded, so that some people are excluded, what normative principle could justify these exclusions? Liberal theory tends to insist on the primacy of consent as the basis of political society and so fails to explain the reliance of liberal democracies on birthright membership, especially the distribution of citizenship to foreign-born descendants of citizens. Applied to expressly kinship-based polities like Aboriginal communities, liberal approaches prioritize non-discrimination, potentially denying to those communities the capacity to distribute membership by reference to characteristics listed as ‘prohibited grounds’ in human rights law, including, most problematically, race and ethnicity. The article outlines the parallels between Canadian citizenship law, the Indian Act regime, and First Nations’ membership codes, and examines the distinctive role to be played by section 35 of Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 in tempering non-discrimination logics. It concludes that existing justificatory tests (the ‘valid legislative object’ test, and the section 1 ‘reasonable limits’ test) are unlikely to provide a way forward, but that a promising methodology can be discerned in Canadian law and policy, in which the ‘reasonableness’ of Aboriginal descent–based exclusions is assessed relative to the characteristics of a free and democratic Aboriginal community. I suggest that this adaptation of liberal non-discrimination norms is an expression of the continuing importance of kinship and descent boundaries in settler-state constitutionalism. Although many questions remain to be resolved, Canadian human rights laws and methodologies could assist in the primary challenge posed to settler-state political theory: the reconciliation of tribal and liberal forms of political organization.
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Aboriginal law disputes are disputes that arise in the spaces between Indigenous and non-Indigenous societies. To date, the Supreme Court of Canada has resolved Aboriginal law disputes under section 35 by relying heavily on the common law to the exclusion of Indigenous legal traditions and principles. In this article, the author argues that applying a bijural interpretation of the principle of respect provides a promising pathway forward in resolving Aboriginal law disputes in a way that supports the grand purpose of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982—reconciliation. The author discusses the principle of respect by considering both non-Indigenous and Indigenous theories to propose a robust conception of respect to guide Aboriginal law jurisprudence. She then suggests three ways to implement the principle of respect in the intercultural relationship: (1) making interdependence and relationships primary; (2) rejecting colonial attitudes and stereotypes of Indigenous peoples; and (3) creating political and legal space for the expression and flourishing of cultural difference.
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This article presents a study of the main characteristics (actors, values, principles, and rules) of the Quebec and Innu legal traditions with respect to their relationship to territory. This primarily descriptive study is followed by an analysis of the interactions that govern the two legal traditions. The article highlights the process of invalidation of the rules of Indigenous law effectuated by Quebec’s law of public and private property, and land resources more generally.
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"In 1982, Canada formally recognized Aboriginal rights within its Constitution. The move reflected a consensus that states should and could use group rights to protect and accommodate subnational groups within their borders. Decades later, however, no one is happy. This state of affairs, Panagos argues, is rooted in a failure to define what aboriginality means, which has led to the promotion and protection of a single vision of aboriginality--that of the justices of the Supreme Court. He concludes that there can be no justice so long as the state continues to safeguard a set of values and interests defined by non-Aboriginal people."-- Provided by publisher.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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