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This article begins with a review of the first manifestations of the civilian institution of absence in Roman law and the French Napoleonic Code. It then retraces the historical and conceptual origins of Quebec’s law of absence detailing its evolution from the Civil Code of Lower-Canada to the Civil Code of Quebec.
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This chapter is about the interpretation of section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 1 allows ‘limits’ to constitutional rights insofar as they are reasonable and justified in a free and democratic society. It asks the state for moral justification when a right has been infringed by state action. Moral justification has formal and substantive aspects; therefore the application of section 1 deploys a formal framework of proportionality nestled within a thin conception of liberal democratic political morality. The chapter also addresses the relative moral importance of the notion of ‘rights’, as well as the relevance of institutional considerations. It concludes that the section 1 framework follows a standard model of moral justification and cannot be significantly improved upon.
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This chapter considers the effect of section 1, the “justification” section of the Canadian Charter, on the doctrinal development of section 15, the equality section. It begins by describing the development of the section 15 substantive equality analysis, including the claim of a conceptually complete separation from the section 1 analysis of state justification. The chapter then identifies some features of section 15 which suggest that this separation is less than complete, including the existence of section 15(2), and anxieties over constraining government action. The chapter then turns to three post-2001 cases in which the Supreme Court of Canada found discrimination under the Charter but then held that discrimination was “justified” through section 1, and asks what these cases might reveal about the symbolic significance of a finding of discrimination and the Court’s struggle with institutional competence concerns in equality claims.
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This paper proposes a fundamental reshaping of the law regarding presumptions of legislative intent in statutory interpretation. Looking to substantive presumptions in particular, it reviews the jurisprudence and concludes that greater consistency would be desirable and that tensions should be resolved between the traditional approach to substantive presumptions and the modern approach to statutory interpretation consistently adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. Our proposal seeks to provide a uniform methodology for the use of substantive presumptions by incorporating them into the contextual analysis mandated by the modern approach set out in Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, [1998] 1 SCR 27, 154 DLR (4th) 193. Rejecting the language of “presumptions” and rules of “strict” or “liberal” construction, it argues in favour of interpretation that relies on a transparent discussion of all relevant sources of statutory meaning (including textual and contextual sources, such as the values underlying substantive presumptions) and against a reflexive or mechanical application of substantive presumptions.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Has French law abandoned the concept of « cause » ? That is the impression one might have on reading the new provisions of the Civil Code, introduced by the Ordonnance of 10 February 2016, and certain commentaries. Accused of being a source of deviance and misunderstanding, the « cause » had to be eradicated, it was said, so that clarity, security and attractiveness of the Code be restored. A closer look, however, shows how far from reality this much-told fable actually is. Two sets of factors bear witness to the perennity of the « cause » in the new law. Firstly, the vast majority of previous « cause »-based solutions are taken up by new provisions. The « cause » remains but its presence is masked by a new designation (« motive » or « purpose », for example). Secondly, there are situations where, in a quest for coherence or in order to fill a gap, a « cause »-based reasoning will prevail exactly as it did before the reform. When all is said and done, it is a strange reform that removes the name while allowing the substance to remain.
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