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Basis for the jurisdiction to stay proceedings - comparison of Commonwealth countries - rationale for the jurisdiction to stay proceedings - relationship between jurisdiction and remedy.

An article from McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill, on Érudit.

It has been suggested that the Canadian prime minister tends to enjoy powers to a degree that is unhealthy in a democratic society. This article evaluates the "prime minister as autocrat" argument that has gained currency, if not in the academic literature, certainly in the popular media. It is suggested that while there has been a relative increase in the concentration of power in the centre — the centre defined as the prime minister, his entourage and key central agencies — the portrait of prime ministerial autocracy has been overdrawn. None the less, reforms are desirable. Particularly ones that create or enhance counterweights to prime ministerial power will likely improve Canadian democracy. These reforms should focus not so much on strengthening the role of individual MPs but on reinforcing the position of cabinet, the parliamentary caucus and senate vis-à-vis the prime minister. In this respect, five possible reforms are discussed, and their prospects of being adopted assessed: proportional representation for the House of Commons, an elected senate, strengthened parliamentary caucuses, a fixed time-table for elections and the New Zealand approach to the appointment of senior officials.

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Abstract: Cabinet secrecy is a cornerstone of the constitution of the Westminster system of government and is safeguarded by convention, common law and statute law in leading Westminster regimes. Secrecy of cabinet proceedings is very much part of the efficient constitution, but the protections afforded by convention and law are neither well understood nor particularly popular. This article examines the convention and how it differs from the common law and statute law treatments of cabinet secrecy. It considers the essential requirements for cabinet secrecy: collective decision-making; the protection of the views and opinions of ministers; and several related problems of the constitution, including the role of the cabinet as the informal executive, the use of the cabinet as an administrative coordinating mechanism, and -unique to Canada - the use of statute law to remove the courts from their traditional role of determining the balance between individual rights and those of the state. Cabinet secrecy is essential to a system of government where responsible ministers collectively decide the government's policy, but in order to play a proper role in our affairs the convention on secrecy needs to be constitutionally validated by the articulation of its purpose and scope. Sommaire: Le secret ministériel est une pierre d'angle de la constitution de Westminster, protégé par la convention constitutionnelle, la common law et la législation dans les principaux pays du système de Westminster. Le secret ministériel fait intimement partie de la constitution efficace, mais les protections procurées par la convention et la Loi ne sont ni bien comprises N particulièrement bien vues. Cet article examine la convention et comment elle se démarque de la façon dont la common law et le droit législatif interprètent le secret ministériel. Il examine les conditions essenticlles du secret ministériel: la prise de décision collective et la protection des points de vue et opinions des ministres. II examine également plusieurs problèmes connexes de la constitution, y compris le rôle du cabinet comme le pouvoir exécutif officieux; le cabinet comme un mécanisme de coordination administrative et - propre au Canada

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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

The author raises questions about potential threats to our democratic order that may arise from advancements in surveillance technology. Among the developments that concern him are the increasing power of investigators to conduct surveillance, the enhanced ability of the public and private sectors to share information and the steady growth in the sophistication of surveillance technology. At the same time, there is less scrutiny of surveillance practices by independent bodies. The author argues that these factors are combining to make surveillance of individuals dangerously easy. He warns that this may erode key democratic values, particularly freedom of expression and the right to privacy. The author reviews the 'Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)', and concludes that while it is a good first step, it falls short by not adopting the European Union's strict approach to consent. As a result,further measures are needed to ensure that democratic values are adequately preserved, such as stronger laws dictating how government and private agencies collect and store information as well as greater accountability of government to its citizens. In addition, to help ensure such accountability, the author argues that there should be a method of tracking government searches for information. Finally, the author suggests an alternative system under which the personally identifying elements of collected information are removed and stored separately, accessible only upon independently verified grounds.

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This paper is a feminist judgment in R v JA (Supreme Court of Canada 2011), a spousal sexual assault case involving the issue of whether parties can consent in advance to sexual activity that will occur while they are asleep or unconscious. The Supreme Court’s ruling in JA has generated critique and debate amongst feminist and law and sexuality scholars that pits women's equality and security interests against their affirmative sexual autonomy. Using the methodology of a feminist judgment, I endeavour to analyze whether it is possible to adopt an approach to advance consent that protects or at least balances all of these interests. My particular focus is the spousal context, where courts have often interpreted the sexual assault provisions of the Criminal Code to the detriment of women’s sexual integrity and equality, yet where arguments about affirmative sexual autonomy have also predominated. Taking a harm-based approach to criminality that considers both negative and positive sexual autonomy, the judgment concludes that advance consent should not be considered valid without certain legal safeguards being put into place.Este artículo es una sentencia feminista de R v JA (Tribunal Supremo de Canadá 2011), un caso de agresión sexual conyugal que implica la cuestión de si las partes pueden consentir de antemano una actividad sexual que ocurrirá mientras están dormidos o inconscientes. El fallo de la Corte Suprema en JA ha generado críticas y debates entre feministas e investigadores en derecho y sexualidad, que enfrentan los intereses de igualdad y seguridad de la mujer con su autonomía sexual afirmativa. Utilizando la metodología de un juicio feminista, se intenta analizar si es posible adoptar un enfoque de consentimiento anticipado que proteja, o al menos equilibre, todos estos intereses. El enfoque particular es el contexto conyugal, donde los tribunales han interpretado a menudo las disposiciones sobre el asalto sexual del Código Penal en detrimento de la integridad sexual y la igualdad de las mujeres, incluso también donde también han predominado los argumentos sobre la autonomía sexual positiva. A partir de un acercamiento a la criminalidad basado en el daño, que considera la autonomía sexual negativa y positiva, la sentencia concluye que el consentimiento previo no debe ser considerado válido sin que se pongan en práctica ciertas garantías legales. DOWNLOAD THIS PAPER FROM SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2891024

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.