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In recent years Chambers, Smith, McFarlane and Stevens have all sought to explain the nature of equitable proprietary rights by way of the concept of a ‘right to (or ‘in’, or ‘against’) a right’. In this paper I argue that there is a sense in which this conceptualisation of the beneficiary’s equitable proprietary under a trust is illuminating, but that, rather than a right to the trustee’s possessory interest in tangible property, the ‘rights’ of the trustee in which the beneficiary is interested are the trustee’s powers of title. I also contend, in a ‘fusionist’ spirit, that equitable property interests should not be treated as a particular ‘legal kind’, but rather that only interests under trusts should be regarded as a distinct sort of property interest within the numerus clausas. I go on to show how the proposed analysis best explains (1) our notion of ‘beneficial interest’ under a trust; (2) why a trustee is not a residual claimant to the trust assets; (3) the interest of a discretionary object of a trust; (4) the rules of and rationale for tracing; and (5) the ‘automatic’ resulting trust.

"In recent years, trust law has continued to expand its influence at a rapid pace, particularly in the area of pension trusts, where it plays a key role in resolving conflicts over the administration, creation, termination, and revocation of pension funds. The flexible nature of trusts results in its continued development, especially in the areas of resulting and constructive trusts. This new edition offers substantially revised chapters on both types of trust, as well as many more caselaw references. Chapter 6 explores the various situations in which a resulting trust can arise, examines the important role of intention in finding a resulting trust, and analyzes recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court on the presumptions of resulting trust and advancement. Chapter 7 offers an updated discussion of the constructive trust, which courts increasingly employ as a tool for remedying unjust enrichment in cohabitation cases."--Pub. desc.

The breadth and scope of copyright limitations and exceptions has emerged as a major policy issue around the world.² Some narrow limitations on copyright holders’ rights, such as quotation, remain uncontroversial, yet more expansive, flexible exceptions have generated fierce debate. Virtually all domestic copyright laws include some limitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights otherwise granted to copyright holders, typically achieved through the adoption of one of two models. One approach is a “fair use” model, which is widely viewed as the most flexible limitation and exception on the copyright holders’ rights, given its potential applicability to any circumstance or

Canadian copyright collectives and the Copyright Board have in recent years advanced the theory that when the Board certifies collectives’ tariffs (or fixes the royalties in individual cases), those tariffs become mandatory on users. Users have no choice whether to deal with the collective; they must pay the specified royalties as long as they make a single unauthorized use of a work from the collective’s repertoire. Many users, for some strange reason, have also subscribed to this view, despite its extraordinary consequences. This article, first in a series of two, shows that this spectre of a “mandatory tariff” lacks any basis in law. Established case law debunks it, standard principles of statutory interpretation contradict it and the legislative history discredits it. An approved tariff creates a compulsory licence that interested users can avail themselves of, if they wish to obtain a licence, but it does not force users to become licensees. Copyright collectives can recover unpaid royalties only from users who offered to pay them and later default on their payment.

Canadian copyright collectives and the Copyright Board have in recent years advanced the theory that when the Board certifies collectives' tariffs (or fixes the royalties in individual cases), those tariffs become mandatory on users. Users have no choice whether to deal with the collective; they must pay the specified royalties as long as they make a single unauthorized use of a work from the collective's repertoire. Many users, for some strange reason, have also subscribed to this view, despite its extraordinary consequences. This is a second article in a series of two. The previous article showed that the “mandatory tariff” theory cannot, as a matter of statutory interpretation and in light of the case law, withstand scrutiny. This article shows that in addition, construing the Act in accordance with the “mandatory tariff” theory gives rise to numerous practical challenges, conceptual puzzles, procedural nightmares, and constitutional headaches, each of which should weigh the scales against it. In contrast, the “voluntary licence” theory avoids all these quandaries, and, in addition to being consistent with earlier case law, appears clear, simple, and coherent.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

In recent years, unwritten constitutional principles often find their place in Canadian constitutional law via their supposed foothold in the part of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 that refers to “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom”. Principles such as judicial independence, democracy, federalism, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and protection of minorities have been derived from the preamble. This article looks through over a hundred years of Supreme Court of Canada case law in order to determine what that preambular phrase has meant over time. It turns out that in the years immediately after 1867, it referred to what we now call political constitutionalism. A hundred or so years later, this same passage came to be associated with legal constitutionalism, though the Court has more recently backed away from the fullest implications of that approach. This article proposes a reading of the preamble and constitutional principles that is consistent with recent Supreme Court of Canada case law and defensible given current jurisprudential trends. That reading gives due regard to the traditional meaning of the rule of law all the while acknowledging that there are genuinely hard cases (particularly prevalent at the Supreme Court level) where neither rules nor principles provide clear answers. In those circumstances, respect for the rule of law requires as much wisdom and judgement as it does application of more prosaic legal skills. This article therefore recommends what is here referred to as a “sustainable jurisprudence” that offers an essential bridge between by now orthodox Dworkinian principle-based reasoning and contextual studies more commonly found in socio-legal, feminist, and other critical literature.

This article considers the content of the unwritten principle of democracy and its potential relevance in Canadian constitutional interpretation. The unwritten principles of federalism, the rule of law and constitutionalism, democracy, and the protection of minorities set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession Reference have received extensive academic attention. Much yet remains unknown, however, about the democracy principle. This article argues that we should interpret the unwritten principle as embodying a “thin” or procedural account of democracy tied to meaningful participation, rather than a “thick” version imposing specific outcomes or broader obligations. I argue that whatever the weight of a “thick” account of democracy, a “thin” understanding is preferable for filling in the content of a constitutional principle that has legal force. The central critiques of the use of unwritten principles in constitutional interpretation are 1) that they lack legitimacy and 2) that they are incoherent in relation to one another. Operationalizing a thin version of democracy in constitutional interpretation responds better to the claims that the unwritten principles lack legitimacy or are incoherent. A thin account still permits the unwritten principle to carry out its functional role in constitutional interpretation, such as enabling courts to fill in gaps in the text or to engage in structural reasoning. The article considers the implications of this approach for referendums and municipal elections.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.