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This article traces the evolution of the Canadian approach to privateinternational law from Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye to Castillo v. Castillo and identifiesfour major flaws that have significant implications for both privateinternational law and Canadian federalism: (1) ambiguous and inconsistentterminology that undermines the conceptual foundation of this approach whileobscuring its potential impact; (2) the Court’s use of American conflict oflaws jurisprudence to reinforce a deferential orientation in Canadianprivate international law; (3) the Court’s vision of the international orderand understanding of public international law, which has begun to affect theCanadian federal system; and (4) the model of the Canadian Constitutionemployed in these cases, which may have broad negative consequences forprovincial interests. The article argues that these flaws are remediable,that both constitutional text and recent opinions contain resources usefulto this end, and that, however the Court decides to address these problems,subsequent iterations of the Canadian approach to private international lawshould emphasize clarity, consistency, and comprehensiveness., Sommaire Cet article trace l’évolution de l’approche canadienne au droitinternational privé à partir de Morguard Investments Ltd. c. De Savoye jusqu’à Castillo v. Castillo. Il cernequatre défauts majeurs qui ont des conséquences significatifs tant pour ledroit international privé que pour le fédéralisme canadien, dont: (1)l’emploi d’une terminologie ambiguë et contradictoire qui mine lesfondements conceptuels de cette approche tout en déguisant son impactpotentiel; (2) l’utilisation par la Cour de la jurisprudence américaine enmatière de droit international privé pour justifier une orientationdéférentielle en droit international privé canadien; (3) la vision de laCour de l’ordre international et sa compréhension du droit internationalpublic, qui ont des effets sur le système fédéral canadien; et (4) le modèlede la constitution canadienne révélée dans ces cas, qui pourrait avoir desérieux effets négatifs sur les intérêts provinciaux. L’article affirme queces défauts peuvent être rémédiés, que les textes constitutionnels et desopinions récentes révèlent des ressources utiles à cette fin, et que, peuimporte la façon dont la Cour s’y prend pour adresser ces problèmes,l’approche future du Canada au droit international privé doit avant toutêtre claire, uniforme et compréhensive.

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It has been suggested that the Canadian prime minister tends to enjoy powers to a degree that is unhealthy in a democratic society. This article evaluates the "prime minister as autocrat" argument that has gained currency, if not in the academic literature, certainly in the popular media. It is suggested that while there has been a relative increase in the concentration of power in the centre — the centre defined as the prime minister, his entourage and key central agencies — the portrait of prime ministerial autocracy has been overdrawn. None the less, reforms are desirable. Particularly ones that create or enhance counterweights to prime ministerial power will likely improve Canadian democracy. These reforms should focus not so much on strengthening the role of individual MPs but on reinforcing the position of cabinet, the parliamentary caucus and senate vis-à-vis the prime minister. In this respect, five possible reforms are discussed, and their prospects of being adopted assessed: proportional representation for the House of Commons, an elected senate, strengthened parliamentary caucuses, a fixed time-table for elections and the New Zealand approach to the appointment of senior officials.

Abstract: Cabinet secrecy is a cornerstone of the constitution of the Westminster system of government and is safeguarded by convention, common law and statute law in leading Westminster regimes. Secrecy of cabinet proceedings is very much part of the efficient constitution, but the protections afforded by convention and law are neither well understood nor particularly popular. This article examines the convention and how it differs from the common law and statute law treatments of cabinet secrecy. It considers the essential requirements for cabinet secrecy: collective decision-making; the protection of the views and opinions of ministers; and several related problems of the constitution, including the role of the cabinet as the informal executive, the use of the cabinet as an administrative coordinating mechanism, and -unique to Canada - the use of statute law to remove the courts from their traditional role of determining the balance between individual rights and those of the state. Cabinet secrecy is essential to a system of government where responsible ministers collectively decide the government's policy, but in order to play a proper role in our affairs the convention on secrecy needs to be constitutionally validated by the articulation of its purpose and scope. Sommaire: Le secret ministériel est une pierre d'angle de la constitution de Westminster, protégé par la convention constitutionnelle, la common law et la législation dans les principaux pays du système de Westminster. Le secret ministériel fait intimement partie de la constitution efficace, mais les protections procurées par la convention et la Loi ne sont ni bien comprises N particulièrement bien vues. Cet article examine la convention et comment elle se démarque de la façon dont la common law et le droit législatif interprètent le secret ministériel. Il examine les conditions essenticlles du secret ministériel: la prise de décision collective et la protection des points de vue et opinions des ministres. II examine également plusieurs problèmes connexes de la constitution, y compris le rôle du cabinet comme le pouvoir exécutif officieux; le cabinet comme un mécanisme de coordination administrative et - propre au Canada

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The author raises questions about potential threats to our democratic order that may arise from advancements in surveillance technology. Among the developments that concern him are the increasing power of investigators to conduct surveillance, the enhanced ability of the public and private sectors to share information and the steady growth in the sophistication of surveillance technology. At the same time, there is less scrutiny of surveillance practices by independent bodies. The author argues that these factors are combining to make surveillance of individuals dangerously easy. He warns that this may erode key democratic values, particularly freedom of expression and the right to privacy. The author reviews the 'Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)', and concludes that while it is a good first step, it falls short by not adopting the European Union's strict approach to consent. As a result,further measures are needed to ensure that democratic values are adequately preserved, such as stronger laws dictating how government and private agencies collect and store information as well as greater accountability of government to its citizens. In addition, to help ensure such accountability, the author argues that there should be a method of tracking government searches for information. Finally, the author suggests an alternative system under which the personally identifying elements of collected information are removed and stored separately, accessible only upon independently verified grounds.

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Citizenship is a key factor in the development of national identity. Any system for establishing and defining citizenship is meaningless as a tool for the creation of such an identity, however, without control of the mechanisms by which this system is designed and implemented. In this paper I propose to examine the constitutional status of an Aboriginal right to control the design and implementation of citizenship codes. As the judiciary in Canada begins to grapple with questions of Aboriginal self-determination, it must begin to consider the extent to which its own vision of Canada as a constitutional democracy, currently engaged in a project of reconciling Aboriginal peoples to the sovereignty of the Crown, will set out parameters for locating and constructing such a right. Within the confines of constitutional law in Canada, do Aboriginal peoples have a right to design and implement their own citizenship codes, free from interference from Canadian governments? Alternatively, is there such a right, but subject to some measure of control by the Crown, and perhaps subject to other constitutional instruments, such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms?

Section 25 of the 'Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' is an important, yet not fully understood, interpretive provision. This section plays an important role in Canada's constitutional framework by shielding the rights of aboriginal people from negative impacts that the 'Charter' may have on such rights. However, the exact scope and significance of the role that section 25 plays in 'Charter' interpretation is uncertain. Through a textual analysis of section 25, this paper attempts to provide guidance on the provision's possible interpretation and application. In particular, the implementation of section 25 and the maintenance of a balance between the individual and collective rights of aboriginal people will be explored Such commentary is required because the role of section 25 will inevitably become more relevant as more aboriginal self-government agreements and arrangements are concluded.

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