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McGill Law Journal Revue de droit de McGill PRIVACY, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, AND INCREMENTALISM: LEGAL IMAGINATION AND THE RECOGNITION OF A PRIVACY TORT IN ONTARIO Thomas DC Bennett* This article considers the nature of com- mon law development as exemplified by the re- cent privacy case of Jones v. Tsige. The author focuses on Jones, in … Continued

Many scholars have offered theories that purport to explain the whole of the law of torts. At least some of these theories do not seem to be specific to a single jurisdiction. Several appear to endeavor to account for tort law in at least the major common law jurisdictions or even throughout the common law world. These include Ernest Weinrib's corrective justice theory, Robert Stevens's rights theory, and Richard Posner's economic theory. This article begins by explaining why it is appropriate to understand these three theories as universal theories of tort law and why it is important that they be so understood. This explanation draws upon various overt claims (or other strong intimations) made by the theorists themselves to the effect that this is how their respective accounts should be understood. The article then proceeds to test these theories, all of which are leading accounts of tort law, against the evidence in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The parts of tort law on which we focus are (1) the breach element of the action in negligence, (2) the law that determines when a duty of care will be owed in respect of pure economic loss, (3) the law that governs the availability of punitive damages, (4) the defense of illegality, and (5) the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and its descendants. The article concludes that none of the theories is a satisfactory universal account of tort law. All of them suffer from significant problems of fit in that they cannot accommodate (often even approximately) the areas of law that we discuss. Although each of the theories contains a great many valuable insights, they all nonetheless fall well short of accomplishing that which they are held out as providing. In the course of this analysis, the article explains why this is an appropriate line of criticism and identifies the degree of lack of fit that we regard as being “significant.”

This article explores issues associated with mutual claims of domestic violence in the context of research on gender and violence, and in the context of litigation tactics commonly employed by perpetrators in child custody and access cases. Quotations from parents involved in such cases illustrate why accurate assessment of mutual cliams requires complete information about social context and the analysis of patterns of domination, power and control in the relationship over time. Recent developments in Canadian law ought to enhance the ability of judges to take such evidence into account. The article aims to provide a lens through which to understand and assess such cases.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

In the article, we make three claims. First, we argue that a large number of what are traditionally seen as separate torts are, at their core, all about affronts to the dignity of the victim. These include offensive battery, assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, invasion of privacy, some nuisances, and abuse of process (malicious prosecution). These torts do not involve direct physical harm but, rather, emotional distress from having your dignity attacked. Second, we argue that as these torts have developed inside of their own doctrinal silos, there are important differences among the laws governing them. Third, we argue that these differences are not justified and that it would be better to create a consistent tort approach to dignitary harm: tort recovery should lie for injuries resulting from wrongful conduct that is highly offensive and causes more than minor harm. This, it turns out, is the standard that currently applies in a majority of jurisdictions for privacy invasions. If more widely adopted, this standard would, for example, far more easily allow recovery for nasty verbal sexual (or other) harassment, since intentional infliction of emotional distress currently requires a much stronger showing. At the same time, it would preclude recovery for minor physical touchings that technically now qualify as offensive battery. We think this achieves the balance much better.

This article proposes a new conceptual framework for parent-child and adult relationships in the Civil Code of Québec based on the theory of relationships of economic and emotional interdependency. It puts forward a new théorie générale for relationships in Quebec civil law. It argues that the Code should concentrate on relationships of economic and emotional interdependency, irrespective of their form or of their fulfillment of formalities. Their content and qualities should be the law’s object, hence allowing for a functional account of families and personal lives. Doing so would require a recodification of economic and emotional relationships in the Code, to provide a more meaningful legal framework addressing families and personal lives. Fundamentally, the hope is to shift the normative content of family law in Quebec private law from “the family” to relationships, and to take a stance against family law exceptionalism.

How intimate partner violence (IPV) is conceptualized affects what we see when we look at situations involving IPV and what we think the solutions to the problem of IPV are—either in individual cases or in the development of broader legal and policy responses. In this article, it is suggested that while conceptualizing IPV as coercive control is an improvement over previous understandings, it does not go far enough. Coercive control must be located within a broader conceptualization of IPV as a form of social and systemic entrapment if it is not to operate in a harmful manner for victim-survivors.

This article reviews the background, introduction, and critical response to new criminal offenses of coercive control in England/Wales and Scotland. How the new Scottish offense is implemented will determine whether it can overcome the shortcomings of the English law. We then review new evidence on four dimensions of coercive control: the relationship between “control” and “violence,” coercive control in same-sex couples, measuring coercive control, and children’s experience of coercive control. Coercive control is not a type of violence. Indeed, level of control predicts a range of negative outcomes heretofore associated with physical abuse, including post-separation violence and sexual assault; important differences in coercive control dynamics distinguish male homosexual from lesbian couples; measuring coercive control requires innovative ways of aggregating and categorizing data; and how children experience coercive control is a problem area that offers enormous promise for the years ahead.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.