Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Resource type
Authors/contributors
- Tversky, Amos (Author)
- Kahneman, Daniel (Author)
Title
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Abstract
This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgments under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgments and decisions in situations of uncertainty.
Publication
Science
Publisher
American Association for the Advancement of Science
Date
1974-09-27
Volume
185
Issue
4157
Pages
1124-1131
Accessed
3/17/26, 6:54 PM
Short Title
Judgment under Uncertainty
Library Catalog
science.org (Atypon)
Citation
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
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