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Purposive interpretation leads a double life. As a matter of constitutional practice, it forms the doctrine through which courts in Canada and around the world determine the concrete protections that abstract constitutional rights afford. However, as a matter of constitutional theory, purposive interpretation is routinely rejected as either an empty phrase that offers no alternative to established theories of constitutional interpretation or a dangerous doctrine that provides no basis for distinguishing between justified and unjustified interpretations of constitutional rights. This essay formulates a conception of purposive interpretation that is not vulnerable to these objections. The purposive approach to the interpretation of constitutional rights follows from a set of ideas about how legal interpretation differs from interpretation more broadly, how constitutional interpretation differs from interpretation in other legal domains, and how constitutional interpretation constrains both the purposes it attributes to particular provisions and the application of those purposes to particular contexts. My aim is to show that these ideas fit together in a coherent doctrinal whole that is neither empty nor dangerous. Purposive interpretation is not empty because it offers a genuine alternative to the presuppositions and structure of opposing interpretive paradigms. Purposive interpretation is not dangerous because it provides a principled set of resources for distinguishing between justified and unjustified interpretations.

While the interpretation of Canadian constitutional laws has long been carried by a teleological wave, a textualist backlash has emerged in recent years. This article questions this trend and argues that the teleological method remains the most appropriate for constitutional interpretation.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

The lawyer’s duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice remains largely amorphous and abstract. In this article, I draw lessons about this duty from historical instances in which Attorneys General inappropriately criticized judges. Not only are Attorneys General some of the highest-profile lawyers in the country, but they also face unique tensions and pressures that bring their duties as lawyers into stark relief. I focus on the two instances where law societies sought to discipline Attorneys General for such criticism of judges, as well as a more recent instance in which no discipline proceedings were pursued. I also consider the obligations of Attorneys General when other Ministers inappropriately criticize judges. I conclude that a lawyer must take all reasonable steps in the circumstances to confirm the factual and legal accuracy of any criticism of the judiciary; that law societies should allow reasonable but defined latitude for public criticism of judges; and that, where a client inappropriately criticizes the judiciary, their lawyer must make good-faith efforts to urge the client to discontinue and apologize for such criticism—and if those efforts are unsuccessful, the lawyer must repudiate that criticism themselves or withdraw.

[From Introduction]Inherent in our constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal cases—for offences where imprisonment for five years or more is a possible sentence— is the right to have jurors who are our “peers” and “equals.” This right can be traced back to 1215 when King John signed the Magna Carta to make peace with the wealthy men of England.The route from the Magna Carta to Canadian criminal law in the early twenty-first century is long and convoluted, and extra twists and turns are added when we consider the use of juries in Canada’s North. Here, where the effects of colonialism are still felt on a daily basis, and where communities from which a jury might be drawn sometimes number only a few hundred persons, the ability to obtain a jury comprised of “the peers” of our clients, who are usually Indigenous, can be challenging and sometimes difficult. In this article I offer my perspective, as a practising criminal defence lawyer in the Northwest Territories, on the challenges we face in trying to obtain juries that truly represent the communities from which our clients originate. ... ...More

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

The critical evaluation of the High Court's decision in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee in the conceptual context of the public/private law dichotomy is discussed. The public/private law dichotomy is a formalistic distinction which belies the fact that there are overlaps in public and private law and that all law is in fact guided by considerations of public policy.

Although it has long been acknowledged that heuristics influence judicial decision making, researchers have yet to explore how sentencing guidelines might interact with heuristics to shape sentencing decisions. This article contributes to addressing this gap in the literature in three ways: first, by considering how heuristics might help produce the phenomenon of sentence clustering, in which a significant proportion of sentences are concentrated around a small number of outcomes; second, by reflecting on the role of sentencing guidelines as a feature of the environment within which sentencing decisions are made; and third, by analysing the guidelines from Minnesota and from England and Wales, theorizing how their content might interact with heuristics to make clustering more or less likely. Ultimately, we argue that sentencing guidelines likely affect the role played by heuristics in shaping sentencing decisions and, consequently, that their design should be informed by research evidence from the decision sciences.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

This article will identify the inconsistency and confusion in mediation regarding the definition of mediation, the role of the mediator, and the difference between mediation confidentiality and privilege. Further, it will discuss the confusion and inconsistency in the protection of mediation communication, specifically regarding the definition of mediation communication, the time frame for protected communication, waiver of the protections and exceptions to protected mediation communication. It will provide a roadmap and fact pattern for determining whether mediation communications are protected and if so, the protection they are afforded. Lastly, it will offer recommendations so parties, professionals and the courts may better understand and reap the benefits of mediation.