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This paper proposes a fundamental reshaping of the law regarding presumptions of legislative intent in statutory interpretation. Looking to substantive presumptions in particular, it reviews the jurisprudence and concludes that greater consistency would be desirable and that tensions should be resolved between the traditional approach to substantive presumptions and the modern approach to statutory interpretation consistently adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. Our proposal seeks to provide a uniform methodology for the use of substantive presumptions by incorporating them into the contextual analysis mandated by the modern approach set out in Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd, [1998] 1 SCR 27, 154 DLR (4th) 193. Rejecting the language of “presumptions” and rules of “strict” or “liberal” construction, it argues in favour of interpretation that relies on a transparent discussion of all relevant sources of statutory meaning (including textual and contextual sources, such as the values underlying substantive presumptions) and against a reflexive or mechanical application of substantive presumptions.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Has French law abandoned the concept of « cause » ? That is the impression one might have on reading the new provisions of the Civil Code, introduced by the Ordonnance of 10 February 2016, and certain commentaries. Accused of being a source of deviance and misunderstanding, the « cause » had to be eradicated, it was said, so that clarity, security and attractiveness of the Code be restored. A closer look, however, shows how far from reality this much-told fable actually is. Two sets of factors bear witness to the perennity of the « cause » in the new law. Firstly, the vast majority of previous « cause »-based solutions are taken up by new provisions. The « cause » remains but its presence is masked by a new designation (« motive » or « purpose », for example). Secondly, there are situations where, in a quest for coherence or in order to fill a gap, a « cause »-based reasoning will prevail exactly as it did before the reform. When all is said and done, it is a strange reform that removes the name while allowing the substance to remain.

Concentrating on Canadian experience, specifically litigation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the ‘Charter’), this article seeks to reconcile the access to justice benefits of summary procedures with the government litigant's duty to act in the public interest (or as a ‘model litigant’) and uphold the rule of law. Though acknowledging the benefits that can result from the use of summary procedures to end litigation, the authors observe that compliance with strict requirements in procedural law are frequently dispensed with in the Charter context. In fact, summary procedures can have a devastating effect on the development of Charter rights. The authors ultimately posit that the government should have a duty of restraint in using summary procedures to end public law litigation, and courts should be reluctant to permit the government to preclude such litigation aimed at advancing the evolution of the Charter from reaching hearings on the merits.

This article reflects on both the current operation and potential future application of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. In particular, it explores the significance of the ‘grave risk’ exception contained in Article 13(1)(b) for cases of alleged domestic violence. The deliberations of an international working group (of which the author is a member) tasked with developing a Guide to Good Practice on the interpretation and application of Article 13(1)(b) highlight some of the profound difficulties in finding a way forward on this important issue.

Ashley Smith’s experience in the adult prison system flowed from certain of its systemic features. This article considers whether and how it is possible to reconcile the basic commitments of sentencing law, including the legal aims of punishment, with that systemic portrait. The youth court that ordered Smith’s transfer to adult custody relied upon an idealized conception of adult imprisonment, just as ordinary adult sentencing courts do. Judges purport to stipulate the severity of punishment, but tend not to consider how prison conditions will shape the severity of the sanction. Even where a particular defendant is likely to face unique difficulties in custody, courts tend to take notice in limited and rare ways. Smith’s experience in adult custody challenges us to more clearly identify, and to consider extending, doctrinal sentencing rules that represent a judicial concern with the effects and prospects of imprisonment in particular cases. , L’expérience vécue par Ashley Smith dans le système carcéral pour adultes témoigne de certaines caractéristiques de ce système. Le présent article tente d’établir, d’une part, s’il est possible d’harmoniser les engagements de base des lois régissant la détermination de la peine, y compris les visées légales des sanctions, au système carcéral et, d’autre part, comment arriver à une telle harmonisation entre ces lois et la réalité de ce système. Le tribunal de la jeunesse qui a ordonné le transfert d’Ashley Smith dans un établissement correctionnel pour adultes a eu recours à une conception idéalisée de la détention des adultes, une conception partagée par les tribunaux pour adultes. Les juges prétendent stipuler la sévérité de la peine sans toutefois tenir compte du fait que les conditions de détention accroissent la sévérité de la sanction. Même si un accusé est susceptible d’éprouver des difficultés particulières durant sa détention, les tribunaux ont peu tendance à le remarquer ou à en tenir compte. L’expérience de détention d’Ashley Smith dans un établissement correctionnel pour adultes lance le défi d’identifier plus précisément, voire d’élargir, la doctrine en matière de détermination de la peine témoignant d’une préoccupation judiciaire pour les effets de la détention dans certains cas particuliers.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.

Transcripts of chat logs of naturally occurring, sexually exploitative interactions between offenders and victims that took place via Internet communication platforms were analyzed. The aim of the study was to examine the modus operandi of offenders in such interactions, with particular focus on the specific strategies they use to engage victims, including discursive tactics. We also aimed to ascertain offenders’ underlying motivation and function of engagement in online interactions with children. Five cases, comprising 29 transcripts, were analyzed using qualitative thematic analysis with a discursive focus. In addition to this, police reports were reviewed for descriptive and case-specific information. Offenders were men aged between 27 and 52 years (M = 33.6, SD = 5.6), and the number of children they communicated with ranged from one to 12 (M = 4.6, SD = 4.5). Victims were aged between 11 and 15 (M = 13.00, SD = 1.2), and were both female and male. Three offenders committed online sexual offenses, and two offenders committed contact sexual offenses in addition to online sexual offenses. The analysis of transcripts revealed that interactions between offenders and victims were of a highly sexual nature, and that offenders used a range of manipulative strategies to engage victims and achieve their compliance. It appeared that offenders engaged in such interactions for the purpose of sexual arousal and gratification, as well as fantasy fulfillment.

A preparatory process is widely accepted to be a common feature in the perpetration of sexual offenses. Numerous commentators, however, have documented the difficulties in defining and understanding this process, given its transient nature and its specificity to this one form of criminal behavior. This theoretical review aims to provide a universal model of a grooming process for the achievement of illicit or illegal goals in which achievement requires the compliance or submission of another individual—one that can be applied both to the sexual offending process and beyond. First, an evaluation of three process models of grooming is conducted. Second, using a process of theory knitting, an integrated universal model of illicit grooming is developed. This model unites salient elements of the previous models while seeking to address their limitations. It is founded in control theory and self-regulation approaches to behavior, assumes a goal-directed protagonist, and comprises two distinct phases, namely, (1) a potentiality phase of rapport-building, incentivization, disinhibition, and security-management and (2) a disclosure phase in which goal-relevant information is introduced in a systematic and controlled manner in order to desensitize the target. Finally, the theoretical quality of the model is appraised, and its clinical implications are discussed.

Because of its structuring function, private international law tends to be given a status distinct from the ordinary rules of domestic law. In a federal system, private international law of necessity implicates some aspects of the constitution. In a series of cases beginning in 1990 the Supreme Court of Canada has engaged in a striking reorientation of Canadian private international law, premised on a newly articulated relationship between private international law and the Canadian constitutional system. This constitutional dimension has been coupled with an enhanced notion of comity. The new dynamic has meant that changes in private international law that were initially prompted by constitutional considerations have gone further than the constitutional doctrines alone would demand. This paper traces these developments and uses them to show the challenges that the Supreme Court of Canada has faced since 1990 in constructing a relationship between Canada’s constitutional arrangements and its private international law. The court has fashioned the constitutional doctrines as drivers of Canadian private international law but its own recent jurisprudence shows difficulties in managing that relationship. The piece concludes with lessons to be learned from the experience of the last 25 years.

Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.