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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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An article from Les Cahiers de droit, on Érudit.
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An article from McGill Law Journal / Revue de droit de McGill, on Érudit.
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Although there is a presumption of juror impartiality in Canadian law, this presumption may be set aside where there is evidence of widespread racial bias in the community from which the jury will be drawn. Following R. v. Parks (1993), defendants are entitled to challenge potential jurors if they believe that racial bias will interfere with the ability of the jurors to judge the case impartially. Although the challenge procedure has been in place for some time, little attention has been given to whether this procedure effectively screens jurors for bias. The present study provides an in-depth examination of the challenge for cause procedure through a detailed analysis of the jury selection phase of a sample of cases that occurred in an Ontario courthouse between 2009 and 2011. A total of 32 defendants and 1,392 prospective jurors were involved in these proceedings. Only a small minority of potential jurors (8.3%) reported that they would be unable to judge the case impartially due to the defendant’s race. Despite this, triers found on average 20.9% of prospective jurors unacceptable, suggesting that something other than expressed bias motivated the determination of juror acceptability. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
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Canadian copyright collectives and the Copyright Board have in recent years advanced the theory that when the Board certifies collectives’ tariffs (or fixes the royalties in individual cases), those tariffs become mandatory on users. Users have no choice whether to deal with the collective; they must pay the specified royalties as long as they make a single unauthorized use of a work from the collective’s repertoire. Many users, for some strange reason, have also subscribed to this view, despite its extraordinary consequences. This article, first in a series of two, shows that this spectre of a “mandatory tariff” lacks any basis in law. Established case law debunks it, standard principles of statutory interpretation contradict it and the legislative history discredits it. An approved tariff creates a compulsory licence that interested users can avail themselves of, if they wish to obtain a licence, but it does not force users to become licensees. Copyright collectives can recover unpaid royalties only from users who offered to pay them and later default on their payment.
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Canadian copyright collectives and the Copyright Board have in recent years advanced the theory that when the Board certifies collectives' tariffs (or fixes the royalties in individual cases), those tariffs become mandatory on users. Users have no choice whether to deal with the collective; they must pay the specified royalties as long as they make a single unauthorized use of a work from the collective's repertoire. Many users, for some strange reason, have also subscribed to this view, despite its extraordinary consequences. This is a second article in a series of two. The previous article showed that the “mandatory tariff” theory cannot, as a matter of statutory interpretation and in light of the case law, withstand scrutiny. This article shows that in addition, construing the Act in accordance with the “mandatory tariff” theory gives rise to numerous practical challenges, conceptual puzzles, procedural nightmares, and constitutional headaches, each of which should weigh the scales against it. In contrast, the “voluntary licence” theory avoids all these quandaries, and, in addition to being consistent with earlier case law, appears clear, simple, and coherent.
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Stéphanie Ghozlan, 2015 49-2 Revue juridique Thémis de l'Université de Montréal 399, 2015 CanLIIDocs 4942
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Québec is a distinct society because of its history, its legal system, and its values. Our analysis examines the delicate issue of the relationship between the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and the Civil Code of Québec, the primary expression of Québec's jus commune, as noted in its Preliminary Provision. As of the nineteenth century, a doctrinal trend born of the desire to protect the integrity of the civil law system grew worried about the "disruptive" influence of the common law on the civil law and, more specifically, on the Civil Code of Lower Canada. The doctrine later expressed reluctance as to the entry of fundamental rights into Québec private law. The charters of rights were, and are sometimes still, perceived as disruptive elements, capable of distorting the Civil Code. We want to show that the influence of human rights philosophy on Québec's jus commune is not only inevitable but desirable. The Civil Code and, more broadly, Québec's jus commune, can only be enriched by respect for fundamental rights.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.