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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Recent amendments have underscored punitive aspects in sentencing. This is apparent in the multiplication of mandatory minimum sentences, restriction of conditional sentences, limitation of credit for pre-sentence custody, and doubling the victim surcharge with no discretion for exemption. Apart from their specific effects, these amendments signal a reorientation of the principles and objectives of sentencing expressed in Part XXIII of the Code and in the jurisprudence that has evolved since 1996. They diminish the importance of rehabilitative and restorative aims in favour of greater retribution. As a result, they alter several principles of sentencing that remain in the Code as they were enacted in 1995 - including proportionality, individualization and totality. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
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Three decades of research on public perceptions in Canada has fundamentally shifted academic and policy approaches to understanding public views of crime and punishment. The contributions of Anthony Doob and his colleagues have influenced methodology, such as the inclusion of experimental design, and have supported an underlying commitment to understanding the public's view of crime and its relationship to policy. This article examines key findings coming out of this body of research and the impact of this work on current criminal justice policy in Canada. Despite the significance of this body of work on public perceptions research, the impact on current criminal justice policy appears to be diminishing.
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The actio libera in causa doctrine, as originally formulated by various Enlightenment philosophers, concerns the imputation of responsibility to actors for actions unfree in themselves, but free in their causes. Like our Enlightenment counterparts, contemporary philosophers of criminal law, as well as most Western legal systems (both common law and civil), allow that persons can be responsible for acts that are not free when performed, provided they were free in their causes. The actio libera doctrine allows us to impute unfree actions to persons, provided they were responsible for causing the conditions of unfreedom that characterizes those actions when performed. This doctrine seems to be instantiated in a great many actual legal practices. But I argue that we must distinguish between two importantly different understandings of the doctrine itself and its application in law. On the one hand, the actio libera doctrine allows us to waive the voluntariness requirement that is generally needed for criminal liability. On the other hand, it disallows defendants to appeal to defences they would otherwise be entitled to use to block liability, if they culpably created the conditions of their own defence. The first case involves rules of imputation, while the second concerns culpability, and justifying the actio libera doctrine therefore faces different challenges in the two cases.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.