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The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012, which came into force on 6 July 2012, virtually eliminates the core of federal-level environmental assessment in Canada. Under the new law, federal environmental assessments will be few, fragmentary, inconsistent and late. Key decision-making will be discretionary and consequently unpredictable. Much of it will be cloaked in secrecy. The residual potential for effective, efficient and fair assessments will depend heavily on requirements under other federal legislation and on the uneven diversity of provincial, territorial and Aboriginal assessment processes. This paper reviews the key characteristics of the new law in light of 10 basic design principles for environmental assessment processes, and considers the broader international implications of the Canadian retreat from application of these principles.
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This commentary assesses the key changes to the federal environmental assessment (EA) process contained in the 2012 Budget Implementation Bill. The resulting Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012 (CEAA 2012) is compared to the federal EA process that had been in place since the implementation of the original CEAA in 1995. The article concludes that the key changes brought about by the enactment of CEAA 2012, including the shift in responsibility for EA, the discretionary application of the process, the narrowed scope, new powers of delegation, substitution and equivalency, and the more restricted role of the public all function counter to the improvements to CEAA 1995 recommended in the academic literature. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
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Partisan self-dealing in the design of election laws is a central challenge for democratic governance. This article develops a new conceptual framework, which I call a structural rights approach, that would enable the Supreme Court of Canada to respond effectively to this problem. A structural rights approach uses the language and logic of individual rights to regulate the structure of democratic institutions. In particular, I argue that courts should design democratic rights to remedy the structural deficiencies of the political system. To this end, I claim that the Supreme Court should interpret the right to vote as encompassing a new democratic right – the right to a fair and legitimate democratic process. In addition, I argue that the right to a fair and legitimate democratic process is best understood as a ‘structural right.’ I define ‘structural rights’ as individual rights that take into account the broader institutional framework within which rights are defined, held, and exercised. This article focuses on two cases studies – electoral redistricting and campaign finance – to show how the Court could use the right to a fair and legitimate democratic process to remedy the problem of partisan self-dealing. In addition, this article canvasses a wide array of structural approaches in the Canadian and American law of democracy literatures, and it locates the structural rights approach within this body of scholarship. The article also considers the structural rights approach with reference to theories of dialogue and deference. The structural rights approach not only provides a new paradigm for the Supreme Court’s oversight of the democratic process; it also offers an alternative way to conceptualize democratic rights.