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Purposive interpretation leads a double life. As a matter of constitutional practice, it forms the doctrine through which courts in Canada and around the world determine the concrete protections that abstract constitutional rights afford. However, as a matter of constitutional theory, purposive interpretation is routinely rejected as either an empty phrase that offers no alternative to established theories of constitutional interpretation or a dangerous doctrine that provides no basis for distinguishing between justified and unjustified interpretations of constitutional rights. This essay formulates a conception of purposive interpretation that is not vulnerable to these objections. The purposive approach to the interpretation of constitutional rights follows from a set of ideas about how legal interpretation differs from interpretation more broadly, how constitutional interpretation differs from interpretation in other legal domains, and how constitutional interpretation constrains both the purposes it attributes to particular provisions and the application of those purposes to particular contexts. My aim is to show that these ideas fit together in a coherent doctrinal whole that is neither empty nor dangerous. Purposive interpretation is not empty because it offers a genuine alternative to the presuppositions and structure of opposing interpretive paradigms. Purposive interpretation is not dangerous because it provides a principled set of resources for distinguishing between justified and unjustified interpretations.
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While the interpretation of Canadian constitutional laws has long been carried by a teleological wave, a textualist backlash has emerged in recent years. This article questions this trend and argues that the teleological method remains the most appropriate for constitutional interpretation.
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Roncarelli is remembered fifty years later particularly because of Justice Rand’s now iconic statement that “there is no such thing as absolute and untrammelled discretion.” Justice Rand defined “untrammelled discretion” as circumstances where action can be taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the decision maker. This statement has been understood to mean that all public regulation exercised through discretionary decision-making by executive officials has legal boundaries, and that the role of the courts is to ensure that decisions do not exceed those boundaries.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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The lawyer’s duty to encourage respect for the administration of justice remains largely amorphous and abstract. In this article, I draw lessons about this duty from historical instances in which Attorneys General inappropriately criticized judges. Not only are Attorneys General some of the highest-profile lawyers in the country, but they also face unique tensions and pressures that bring their duties as lawyers into stark relief. I focus on the two instances where law societies sought to discipline Attorneys General for such criticism of judges, as well as a more recent instance in which no discipline proceedings were pursued. I also consider the obligations of Attorneys General when other Ministers inappropriately criticize judges. I conclude that a lawyer must take all reasonable steps in the circumstances to confirm the factual and legal accuracy of any criticism of the judiciary; that law societies should allow reasonable but defined latitude for public criticism of judges; and that, where a client inappropriately criticizes the judiciary, their lawyer must make good-faith efforts to urge the client to discontinue and apologize for such criticism—and if those efforts are unsuccessful, the lawyer must repudiate that criticism themselves or withdraw.
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Modern negotiations between the Crown (or private parties) and Canada’s Aboriginal peoples are largely based on the legal principles articulated in major court decisions. Yet those decisions have not yet confronted a fundamental question: how, in the first instance, do we determine which groups can lay claim to the Aboriginal and treaty rights “recognized and affirmed” by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982?
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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Disclaimer: This summary was generated by AI based on the content of the source document.
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In the following paper, the author analyzes the central issues raised by the recognition of aboriginal title under State law. He offers answers to the many unresolved issues concerning the sources of aboriginal title, its conditions of existence and attributes. Concerning the sources of aboriginal title, the author highlights the Supreme Court’s stato-centric approach to the defnition of aboriginal rights and argues, in particular, that the doctrine of continuity of pre-colonial law has more of a metaphoric rather than operational meaning. As for the conditions of the title’s existence, the author concludes that they still remain sufficiently undetermined as to generate legal insecurity and allow judges to conduct, under the guise of an assessment of the historical record, contemporary socio-economic arbitrations between indigenous peoples and the non-indigenous majority. Finally, the analysis of the attributes of aboriginal title brings to light the uncertainty which persists with regard to several fundamental issues, such as, for example, the identity of the holder of title. This uncertainty of the law, as well as the failure of the Supreme Court of Canada to reconcile aboriginal title with modernity, cast doubt on the capacity of indigenous peoples to develop their lands according to their contemporary priorities.
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