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In Canada (A.G.) v. Bedford, the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated three prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code on grounds of overbreadth and gross disproportionality. The implications of Bedford go well beyond the particular context of sex work and even of criminal law. First, the Court held that the three constitutional norms against overbreadth, arbitrariness, and gross disproportionality are distinct from each other rather than aspects of a single norm against overbreadth. Second, the Court held that a Charter applicant could establish a violation of section 7 by showing that a law is overbroad, arbitrary, or grossly disproportionate in its impact on the life, liberty, or security of only one person and that the effectiveness of the law in achieving its policy objectives was not relevant to these norms. There are some difficulties in understanding this highly individualistic approach to section 7, and those difficulties lead to the third implication. By deferring any consideration of the effectiveness of the law to the question of whether it is a proportional limit on a section 7 right, the Court may be indicating a willingness to do something it has never done before: recognize an infringement of a section 7 right as a justified limit under section 1. The Court’s clarification of the relationship between the norms against overbreadth, arbitrariness, and gross disproportionality is welcome, but its individualistic articulation of those norms is difficult to understand and its suggestion that section 7 violations may now be easier to save under section 1 is troubling.

The norm against overbreadth—a law should not be overbroad in relation to its own purposes—is well established as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. But the Supreme Court of Canada’s case law contains two competing formulations of this norm. According to the strict version of the norm, a law is overbroad if it applies in even one (actual or hypothetical) case that is not directly necessary to the achievement of its purpose. According to the relaxed version of the norm, a law is overbroad only if it applies in cases beyond those that are reasonably neces-sary to its operation. The strict version of the norm is unworkable because it relies on two un-tenable assumptions: first, that a law is always an instrument for achieving a purpose that can be fully specified apart from the idea of legal order; second, that a law can be drafted and applied so that it never goes beyond that pur-pose. The result is that, on a proper application of the strict version of the norm, all laws are overbroad. The relaxed version of the norm shares the first assumption but not the second. With respect to those laws that are properly characterized as instrumental, it would be bet-ter to abandon the strict version of the norm and adopt the relaxed version

People have procedural rights because states are under a duty of political morality to provide them with fair procedures for settling disputes about the application of the laws. This obligation flows from the state's duty to treat each person as a free and equal member of the legal order. Yet adherence to procedural rights can impede accuracy in fact-finding, which in turn can result in poor protection for substantive rights. So the state also has a duty to provide a reasonable degree of accuracy in fact-finding. The legal order should therefore strive to improve the accuracy of fact-finding, within the constraints imposed by procedural rights people have. Nevertheless, the duty to provide reasonably accurate procedures is subordinate to the duty to provide procedural rights because the settlement of disputes among free persons must be conducted in a manner that respects their status as free persons.

This paper explores the implications of the idea of a constitution appropriate to a liberal-democratic state for the law of self-defence. The law governing self-defence, like other laws, must also a test of substantive legality appropriate to the constitution: it must be one that could not reasonably be rejected by a person who is a member of a civil condition created with the purpose of curing the insecurities of the state of nature. While this test of substantive legality is insufficiently powerful to determine all the details of the law of self-defence, it does have several important implications. First, the positive law must recognize a right of self-defence in the core case where the defender responds with necessary and proportionate force to a wrongful threat; second, the positive law must also provide at least an excuse leading to acquittal where the defender is reasonably mistaken about one of the conditions in the core case. Furthermore, the positive law must acquit a person who uses necessary and proportionate force to repel an innocent threat because the civil condition can provide no reason for punishing such a person.

Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." This book analyzes all aspects of section 7. It outlines the place of section 7 in the constitutional order; how courts decide whether a particular legal principle is so fundamental that it merits recognition under section 7; the conditions under which section 7 will apply to a legal dispute; the legal norms that have been recognized, or rejected, as principles of fundamental justice under section 7; and the very limited circumstances in which an infringement of section 7 will be justified under section 1. The second edition has been extensively revised to take into account several significant changes in the law over the last several years, including the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in Bedford (sex work) and Carter (medically assisted dying).

The confessions rule—the requirement that the Crown prove the voluntariness of the accused’s statements to persons in authority—is a well-established rule of criminal evidence and is closely connected with the constitutional principle against self-incrimination that it structures. The confessions rule is thus a natural candidate for recognition as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, there are two distinct routes by which the confessions rule might be constitutionalized. Under the “rule of evidence” approach, the confessions rule would be recognized as an aspect of the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Under the “rights violation” approach, the conduct of the state in obtaining an involuntary statement would be treated as a violation of the accused’s constitutional rights.

"This comprehensive treatise covers both civil and criminal law evidence. The book is written for lawyers, judges and students, and covers evidence law topics such as standards of proof, hearsay, similar fact evidence, opinion evidence, witnesses, privilege, and admissibility of evidence."-- Provided by publisher.